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Decentralized growth rates in R&D-based models generally do not match socially 
optimal levels because of R&D externalities. In this non-scale growth model with 
innovation, the decentralized equilibrium does not generate socially optimal outcomes, 
and its growth rate can be either higher or lower than the social optimum. This is firstly 
due to the monopolistic competition in intermediate-good sectors, which causes the 
shortage of intermediate goods supplied to final sector and thus tends to retard the 
economic growth. So the decentralized final output is always lower than its socially 
optimal level if there is no government intervention. Secondly, it is because of the 
existence of R&D externalities: On the one hand, innovators tend to invest too little in 
R&D because they do not take into account the knowledge spillover effect of innovations 
which benefits overall society; on the other hand, they tend to invest too much in R&D 
because they do not internalize the creative destruction effect of innovations on previous 
products. It is difficult to estimate the net effect of these factors.  
The government typically aims at offsetting the differences between the laissez-faire 
and social planner’s economies, especially at adjusting the decentralized growth to its 
social optimum. This work shows this duty could be fulfilled by proper government 
interventions, and then analyses through which ways socially optimal growth can be 
obtained in this non-scale growth model by addressing the growth effects of government 
policies. These findings are valuable not only because it is desirable to know whether or 
not the government can guide the economy into an optimal growth path and how this 
duty can be fulfilled from welfare point of view, but also because these issues are 
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appealing to be analyzed within the frameworks of non-scale R&D based models which 
are consistent with several crucial features of economic development.    
In this work, the government can regulate the behavior of economic growth through 
three aspects. First, the government is able to control the households’ incentive of capital 
holding and investment by capital-income tax and investment subsidy. Second, the 
shortage of final output caused by monopolistic production in intermediate sectors can be 
made up by intermediate-good-purchase subsidy. Third, the innovators’ incentive of 
vertical or horizontal R&D investments can be altered by targeted or untargeted R&D 
subsidies. 
Specifically, an increase of capital-income tax rate has negative growth effect while 
an increase of investment subsidy rate will facilitate economic growth. Intermediate-
good-purchase subsidy is positively related with intermediate-good outputs, final output 
and economic growth rate. Vertical and horizontal R&D subsidies have positive and 
negative growth effects respectively while the overall growth effect of an untargeted 
R&D subsidy is positive. The right dose of policies is affected by the parameters of this 
model, such as population growth rate, R&D productive parameters. The most drastic 
effect comes from the parameter representing the contribution of intermediate goods to 
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In the late 1980s, R&D-based endogenous growth models became very prominent. 
These models claim that R&D activities are powerful engines of economic growth. Such 
R&D activities include horizontal and vertical innovations, which expand the range and 
improve the quality of the products respectively. Important literatures include Paul M. 
Romer (1990), Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1991), as well as Philippe Aghion 
and Peter Howitt (1992), all of which imply that the decentralized growth rate does not 
necessarily match the socially optimal growth rate.1 In particular, Aghion and Howitt 
(1992) model implies that growth is generated by a random sequence of quality 
improving innovations which result from uncertain research activities and these private 
research activities introduce a possibility of excessive growth in decentralized economy if 
they are over-invested. 
In the middle of 1990s, R&D-based endogenous growth models were criticized for 
displaying a problematic scale effect. The scale effect implies that economic growth 
relates with the size of the economy. For example, Romer (1990) model indicates that 
growth rate is positively related with the total human stock employed in research sector; 
Aghion and Howitt (1992) model indicates that growth rate is positively related with 
population size. Such scale effect lacks empirical support [see Charles I. Jones (1995) 
and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)].2 In response, supporters of R&D-based endogenous 
                                                 
1Aghion and Howitt (1992) is developed from the former 1988 model, and their basic thoughts are similar. 
So we discuss the later one only. 
2Jones’ paper argues that the “scale effect” prediction of many recent R&D-based models of growth is 
inconsistent with the time-series evidence in industrialized economies. And it points out this inconsistency 
is especially supported by time-series evidence from R&D sector. A modified version of the Romer model 
is proposed to overcome this problem. Another important literature, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) also 
found only a weak and minor scale effect in a cross-country panel data set.  
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growth models try to eliminate or explain the scale effect with alternative considerations. 
Among them, Howitt resolves this problem by integrating the dynamic progression of 
product variety into the original Aghion and Howitt model and developing the Howitt 
(1999) paper. The Howitt (1999) model emphasizes that innovation is the impetus of 
growth, and it describes an R&D sector that undertakes both horizontal and vertical 
research. So the innovation's contribution to economic growth can be decomposed into 
two parts: one is a long-run component, the progress of leading-edge productive 
technology; and the other is related to the scale of the economy, the growth of product 
variety. The non-scale property comes from that the increasing product variety offsets the 
scale effect. However, the model also implies that decentralized growth is not necessary 
to follow the optimal growth path because of monopolistic competition and R&D 
externalities. 
It is appealing to discuss long-run effects of government policy from the welfare 
point of view within Howitt (1999) model. First, the model shows two important 
properties: the R&D-driven property and non-scale property. The former one is widely 
supported by theoretical and empirical studies which believe technology is the main 
contributor to long-run economic growth. The later one is consistent with the recent 
empirical findings that no strong evidence of scale effect can be found by time-series and 
panel-data research. Therefore, the model is a better describer of the real world. Second, 
this stylized model can provide theoretical support and guidance for government 
intervention. This is mainly due to the endogenous nature of Howitt (1999) model, so the 
policymaker is able to discretionarily design policies to alter the incentives of different 
economic agents. It framework is a little complicated but rather flexible, thus a wide 
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range of policies can be discussed within it. Third, in this model, it is possible for the 
government to keep the economy at its optimal growth potential and to maximize social 
welfare with a combination of designed policies. And various policy instruments can be 
discussed and compared according to their long-run effects on economic growth or social 
welfare. Therefore, the topic is important and interesting, but no much literature has 
addressed it so far. 
This thesis examines whether government policy can guide the long-run economic 
growth to reach the socially optimal level in the Schumpeterian model developed by 
Howitt, and how this duty can be fulfilled. First, the work concerns with government’s 
ability to provide a socially optimal growth and to maximize social welfare under laissez 
faire, and studies the difference between decentralized and social planner’s equilibria. 
Second and most importantly, based on results from above research, this work discusses 
several kinds of government instruments, analyses their rationales and compares their 
impacts on economic growth so as to find proper growth enhancing policies. Then it 
shows that policymaker can adjust economic growth to its social optimum through 
properly designed growth enhancing policies. 
To see the role that the government should play, we follow the usual practice of 
comparing the social planner’s solutions with the decentralized ones and then looking for 
suitable policies to correct the differences between them. In this model, decentralized and 
social planner’s equilibria are mainly different in three aspects: First, under laissez faire, 
the proportions of households’ income allocation to consumption, investment, capital 
holding are different from those of social planner’s economy because households’ 
incentives are distorted. Second, in intermediate sectors, monopolistic competition causes 
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a shortage of intermediate goods supplied to final sector compared with optimal level. 
Third, R&D externalities in decentralized economy result in the differences between the 
R&D input intensities.3 Aimed at these differences and their causes, corrective measures 
are possible to control laissez-faire economy. This thesis incorporates capital-income tax, 
investment subsidy to adjust the households’ incentives of income allocation, uses 
intermediate-good-purchase subsidy to encourage production in intermediate sectors, and 
uses vertical and horizontal R&D subsidies to alter the incentives of different kinds of 
innovations. These policies will be proved to have growth effects on economy in later 
chapters.4 The lump-sum tax is employed to balance government budget, and it has only 
level effect. This work shows that proper usage of above policies is able to guide the 
economy to follow the optimal growth path. 
This thesis is organized as follow: Chapter 1 is the introduction and Chapter 2 is the 
literature review. Chapter 3 introduces the model and elaborates the results of 
decentralized problem, which contains potential policy parameters. Chapter 4 describes 
the social planner’s choices in steady-state equilibrium. Then in Chapter 5, two results 
are compared and the implications to government policy will be derived and assessed. 
The final chapter concludes. 
 
                                                 
3 R&D externalities mainly refer to the intertemporal knowledge-spillover and the creative destruction 
effect, which will be discussed later. See subsection3.1.3, 3.1.5 and chapter 5. R&D input intensity is 
measured by the fraction of final output invested on R&D activities in this work 
4 Growth effect occurs when changes in parameter alter growth rate along balanced path, while level effect 
means changes in parameter raise or lower balance growth path without affecting its slope. In Lucas (1988), 
growth effect and level effect are explained and several regarding literatures are cited at its second part.  
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2. Literature Review 
It is often desirable to know how the government can guide the economy into 
preferable states with maximal social welfare and optimal growth rate in growth theory, 
because it lacks theoretical guarantee that a decentralized economy will automatically 
evolve into an optimal equilibrium from the welfare point of view, and because the 
government plays the role as social controller to maximize overall welfare of entire 
society. Economists provide different explanations on this topic when they address 
distinct aspects of economic growth. Traditionally, three controversial issues are involved 
in this topic. The first is whether the government is able to affect economic growth or not. 
Exogenous growth theories, represented by Solow-Swan (1956) model, point out that 
growth is determined by exogenous parameters and difficult to be affected by policies, 
while the endogenous growth theories, for example Romer (1990) model, believe that 
growth is endogenous and can be adjusted by policymakers. The second issue is through 
which ways the government can affect economic growth, in other words, the growth 
effects of government policies. Enormous literatures are contributed in this area, and 
these literatures generally may not reach an agreement. For example, growth effects of 
taxation have been intensively studied in the recent literature on taxation using different 
models by Rebelo (1991), Jones et al. (1993), Pecorino (1993), Devereux and Love 
(1994), Stokey and Rebelo (1995), Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998), Jinli Zeng and Jie 
Zhang (2002), etc. A more specific example, neoclassical growth theories usually believe 
labor-income tax has negative growth effect, while Jinli Zeng and Jie Zhang (2002) 
shows it has only level effect. The last issue concerns the government’s ability to provide 
a socially optimal growth or maximize social welfare under laissez faire. For example, 
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Diamond (1965) model doubts such ability5, while recent endogenous models support it. 
In sum, the topic is important and attracts enormous research efforts, and various 
explanations are provided when different focuses on economic growth are addressed. In 
following part, we will discuss related literatures in detail. 
At the early stage of growth theory, neoclassical models suggest long-run economic 
growth is exogenous and depends only on exogenous factors which are difficult to be 
affected by government policy.6 In most exogenous models, the laissez-faire growth rate 
is rigidly same as that of social planner’s economy. This rigidity firstly comes from the 
exogenous features of these models, in other words, growth determinants are exogenous 
given by attributes of economies which are same in both decentralized and social 
planner’s economies. It secondly comes from that government lacks effective instruments 
to control the growth rate, as most government policies have only level effects in these 
models. Representatives of the exogenous neoclassical theories include Solow-Swan 
(1956), Frank P. Ramsey (1928) and Peter A. Diamond (1965). Among them, Solow-
Swan (1956), the descriptive growth model, is a milestone of growth theory and often 
referred to as the benchmark of growth analysis. The model assumes that the knowledge 
stock changes at an exogenous rate and production factors are constant returns to scale. It 
claims that long-run growth depends only on the technology progress, and implies the 
                                                 
5 Diamond (1965) assumes that individual has limited life span and welfare is the weighted sum of utilities 
of different generations. Its decentralized equilibrium does not necessary to optimize growth rate or 
maximize social welfare. Government can improve welfare through the policy which aims at eliminate the 
difference cause by limited life span of generations, such as subsiding old individuals using lump-sum tax 
from the young. But because the model shares the exogenous features, these have only level effects. This 
compromises government’s ability to adjust economic growth. 
6 Generally, exogenous factor changes mean that structure changes (e.g. demographics, technology, politics, 
culture) may occur, which would cause both the decentralized and social planner’s equilibria to shift. For 
example, growth rate of knowledge stock decrease in Solow-Swan (1956) model reflects a change in 
technological conditions, and affects both decentralized and social planner’s growth rates. This work does 
not address these issues. 
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growth rates are same in decentralized and social planner’s economies. In this model, 
government policy such as adjusting saving rate has no growth effect.  At the steady 
states, accumulated capital stock does not necessarily reach the golden-rule level,7 but the 
government can control saving rate to make capital stock stay at the golden-rule level 
since this policy has level effects. Frank P. Ramsey (1928) and Peter A. Diamond (1965) 
have similar implications that economic growth is exogenous and capital stock does not 
necessarily reach the golden-rule level. 
Earlier neoclassical growth models have a drawback. Within their framework, capital 
accumulation is the main resource of economic growth. Thus the effect of diminishing 
return on physical capital will inevitably limit economic growth in long run along with 
physical capital stock expanding, and this effect is difficult be offset because other 
factors, such as technological progress and population growth, are given exogenously. To 
overcome this problem, economists began to integrate endogenous approaches into 
growth models. The objects of those approaches are generally not to supplant capital 
accumulation as an explanation of economic growth but to supplement it.8 After some 
growth determinants become endogenous, government policies dealing with those 
endogenous factors may have growth effects, and government becomes more flexible 
facing growth matters.  
Paul M. Romer (1986) is the benchmark of modern literatures among the endogenous 
growth models. His work successfully overcomes the problem encountered by exogenous 
growth models by taking the advantage of endogenous growth of the public knowledge 
                                                 
7 In neoclassical models, final output is divided between consumption and capital investment. Capital stock 
is accumulated through previous investments. Golden-rule level of capital stock refers to the level of capital 
stock at which consumption is at its maximum possible level among balanced growth paths. 
8 See “Endogenous Growth Theory”, Introduction, Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 by Aghion and Howitt. 
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stock. It also points out that a shortage of knowledge accumulation in the non-
intervention competitive equilibrium of the decentralized economy occurs when private 
firms neglect a positive externality from increasing knowledge stock and invest too little 
in research. 9  Thus the laissez-faire growth rate will always be too low. So if the 
government uses lump-sum tax to subsidize the production of knowledge, socially 
optimal growth could be obtained. Another influential article by Robert E. Lucas (1988) 
has similar policy implications. His work employs three approaches to imitate some of 
the main features of economic development, and emphasizes the contribution of 
accumulated factors such as physical capital and human capital to the economic growth.10 
Simultaneously, his work also implies that the decentralized growth rate is too low 
compared with that of the social planner’s economy because of the insufficiency of 
private physical and human capital production. In this instance, proper government 
intervention is preferred from the social welfare point of view. 
After later 1980s, R&D-based growth models became prominent. Important 
literatures include Romer (1990) model. This work shows growth is driven by 
technological change, and claims decentralized growth rate is too low because too little 
human capital is devoted to research in decentralized equilibrium. So a subsidy to 
employment in the research sector, which is financed by lump-sum taxes, has positive 
growth effect because it will increase human capital investment on research sector. Thus 
proper government intervention can adjust growth and increase social welfare in this 
model. Other important literatures, including Grossman and Helpman (1991), as well as 
Aghion and Howitt (1992), also confirm the uncertainty of laissez-faire growth rate to 
                                                 
9 See Romer (1986), Subsection D. Welfare Analysis of the Competitive Equilibrium in Chapter 5. 
10 Lucas mentions in the conclusions of his article that the model developed in section 4 is central, which is 
a two-capital model of growth. 
 9
match its social optimum. The gap between decentralized and social optimal growth is 
introduced by the nature of R&D activities. One kind of R&D activities is to increase the 
variety of products and inherits some characters from neoclassical growth models, so it 
continues to predict that the growth rate will be lower under laissez faire. The other kind 
is to improve the quality of products.11 Models containing such R&D usually imply that 
growth rates can be either too low or too high, because vertical R&D has both positive 
and negative externalities.12 If negative externality dominates, growth will be too high as 
innovator does not take on the negative consequences and over-invests in research, and 
vice versa. The growth rate is finally determined by the net effect. 
In the middle of 1990s, R&D-based models were criticized for scale effects, in 
response, their supporters began to revise or extend their works with alternative 
approaches so as to eliminate or explain the scale effects. Important literatures include 
Paul S. Segerstrom (1998), Alwyn Young (1998) and Howitt (1999). And because factors 
used to offset scale effects are included, government policy dealing with economic 
growth becomes even more sophisticated. But it is attractive to analyze growth effects of 
government policy and its welfare implications through R&D-based models without scale 
effects, because these models are consistent with several important features of economic 
growth empirically. Therefore, various government policies, including flat rate tax, 
consumption tax, R&D subsidies, etc., have been studied extensively in the recent 
literatures with non-scale growth models, especially under the framework of Howitt 
                                                 
11 Aghion and Howitt (1992) model discussed above should be classified as quality improving one. It 
provides the possibility of excessive growth caused by creative destruction of innovations. And it is closely 
related with Howitt (1999) model. 
12 For example, there are both positive and negative R&D externalities in this thesis.  Spillover effect is 
positive externalities, while creative destruction effect is a negative one. Their effects will be discussed in 
detail at Chapter 5. Introduction and analysis of R&D externalities can be found in “Endogenous Growth 
Theory”, Chapter 1 by Aghion and Howitt. 
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(1999). The remarkable Segerstrom (2000) paper, for example, studies the long-run 
growth effects of R&D subsidies, and points out R&D subsidies can either promote or 
retard long-run economic growth. Jinli Zeng and Jie Zhang (2002) paper studies the long-
run growth effects of taxation within the extended Howitt (1999) model, and shows 
consumption and labor-income taxes have no growth effects. Welfare implications of 
growth models are quite intensively discussed in growth literatures. Related literature 
includes Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) which analyzes these issues using a quality 
improving model, but such model exhibits problematic scale effects.13  Other related 
works, such as Romer (1990), show similar problems. So these issues still need to be 
addressed within the framework of non-scale R&D based growth theories, few literatures 
have done so as these theories are relatively new. Therefore, growth effects of 
government policies and their welfare implications need to be examined and the problem 
of how government policies can adjust the growth to reach the socially optimal level 
needs to be analyzed under R&D-based models without scale effects. Thus, this thesis 
addresses these issues within the framework of Howitt (1999).  
 
                                                 
13 See their book, “Economic Growth”, chapter 7. 
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3. The Model and Decentralized Steady-State Equilibrium 
The model assumes that the economy is populated with identical households. The 
basic framework is same as that of Howitt (1999) but with some slight changes. The 
arrival rate of vertical innovation is rewritten by revising the definition of variable tn  to 
unify the expressions used in this work.14 Without loss of generality, discovery rate of 
horizontal innovation is specified by a constant-returns-to-scale function. Furthermore, 
capital-income tax, lump-sum tax, investment subsidy, intermediate-good-purchase 
subsidy, as well as vertical and horizontal R&D subsidies are incorporated into this 
framework to investigate the channels through which government could control the long-
run growth. Labor-income tax and consumption tax are omitted because they are proved 
to have only level effects by Zeng and Zhang (2002).15 In the decentralized economy 
described in this chapter, each intermediate good represents a given technology from 
different vintages and is produced by its monopolist, while final sector, R&D sectors and 
physical capital market are assumed to be perfectly competitive. The final sector uses a 
variety of intermediate goods whose range expands and quality improves over time 
through innovations. The infinite living households maximize their utility according to 
their additive preference over time.  
3.1. Technologies 
                                                 
14 In Howitt (1999) model tn  means the input to vertical innovations, while in this thesis it means the 
fraction of final output invested on vertical innovations. 
15 The two author show that the usual growth effects of consumption tax and labor-income tax do not exist 
in their work which incorporates saving and leisure into the non-scale Schumpeterian model of Howitt 
(1999). Because this work uses the same framework as theirs, and both assume the households are identical 
and infinite living, thus results from their paper are valid in this work too. 
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There are five types of production activities in this economy: final-good production, 
intermediate-good production, physical capital accumulation, vertical and horizontal 
innovations. It is assumed that perfect competition prevails in all sectors except the 
intermediate sectors where there exists temporary monopoly power. The monopoly 
power is temporary because a monopolist’s product will be replaced by a new innovation 
eventually. 
3.1.1. Final-good production 
Final good is produced by labor input and a continuum of intermediate goods, the 
contribution of each intermediate good to final-good production relates with its 






t Y it itY L A x di
α α−= ∫ ,  0 1α< <              (1) 
where tY  is the final output at time t ; tYL  is the labor input to final-good production; itx  is 
the flow of intermediate good i  throughout the economy. itA  is productivity parameter of 
good i  and reflects its technological contents, the part it itA x
α  reflects that an intermediate 
good’s contribution to final-good production is positively related with its technological 
contents.  tQ  is the total number of intermediate goods existing in the society at the date 
t . The parameter α  measures the contribution of an intermediate good to the final-good 
production and inversely measures the market power of the intermediate-good producer. 
                                                 
16 In the original model of Howitt (1999), labor is used only in the intermediate-good production. We 
assume that both the final sector and the intermediate sectors use labor as their inputs to increase some 
flexibility of this framework.  
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The final output is allocated among consumption ( tC ), vertical R&D expenditure 
( vtN ), horizontal R&D expenditure ( htN ), and investment in capital ( tK
•
) as 
t vt ht t tY N N C K
•= + + + .               (2) 
Because the final sector is perfectly competitive, the final sector solves the following 




max   1t
t
Q
t t Y x it itY W L s p x di− − −∫             (3) 
where xs  is the subsidy rate to intermediate-good purchase, and we assume that all kinds 
of intermediate goods share a same intermediate-good-purchase subsidy rate ( )x xis s= for 
simplicity.17 The purpose of this subsidy is to offset the shortage of intermediate goods 
supplied to final-good production. The shortage occurs when monopolists lower output to 
increase prices of their products for profit maximizing.  
tt Y
W L  is total cost on labor 




x it its p x di−∫  is total expense on purchase of intermediate goods. 
                                                 
17 This thesis uses a uniform rate of intermediate-good-purchase subsidy, because our purpose of using this 
subsidy is to offset the shortage of intermediate-good production. By setting intermediate-good-purchase 
subsidy to zero and substituting equation (A.5~A.7) into equation (8~9), we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 112 2 1 111it t it t t tx Q A A L Kγ γ γ α αγ γ γαα γ α α γ − − − + −−= − + Γ  at non-intervention decentralized steady states, 
then comparing it with equation (34), we find that each intermediate good i  is produced in proportion with 
its optimal value, and the proportion is the same as ( ) ( )21 1α α αγ α α γ− + − +  for all intermediate goods, 
so a uniform rate can satisfy our purpose and simplify the model. Of course, the subsidy rates for 
intermediate goods can be different. For example, there could be a technological discriminating subsidy 
policy as ( )xi its f A= . These topics are also interesting and need future research but beyond the 
considerations of this thesis. 
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From the first-order conditions of equation (3), we derive the inverse demand 
functions for labor and intermediate good i  respectively as 
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x it x
Yp L A x
s x s
α αα − −∂= =− ∂ − ,            (5) 
where tW  is the wage rate; itp  is the price of intermediate good i . The final good is 
viewed as the numeraire throughout this work. Equation (4) describes the labor market 
clear condition in final sector and implies the wage rate is equal to marginal output of 
labor. And in the equilibrium, the wage rates should be the same in final and intermediate 





s− compared with that without intermediate-good-purchase subsidy.
18 In this situation, 
the incentive of intermediate monopolist’s to produce is strengthened. 
3.1.2. Intermediate-good production  
Each kind of intermediate good is produced using labor and physical capital, itL  









−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
,  0 1γ< <              (6) 
where γ  measures the contribution of labor input to the intermediate-good  production. 
itA  is the productivity parameter related to the intermediate good’s technological vintage 
                                                 
18 The price with subsidy is ( )1 1 xs− times the price without subsidy, so the difference equals to ( )1x xs s− . 
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as in function (1).  The purpose of using the productivity parameter itA  to divide the 
physical capital input itK  is to reflect the fact that industries tend to be more capital 
intensive as technology advances.  
The economy has two resource constraints: the sum of labor used in final-good 
production and in intermediate-good production is no larger than total population; the 
sum of capital consumed in all intermediate industries is no larger than the entire capital 
stock. In this model, the two resources must be completely exhausted in decentralized 
economy because there is no disutility from resource consumptions. Thus labor and 





Y it tL L di L+ =∫  and 
0
tQ
it tK di K=∫  respectively. 
Given the wage rate tW , the interest rate tr , as well as the final sector’s inverse 
demand function for intermediate goods, the incumbent monopolist of good i  seeks to 
maximize his profit by choosing the optimal output or by deciding the monopolistic 
price itp . In symmetrical economy, the monopolistic price satisfies the market clearing 
conditions. Specifically the producer of intermediate good i  solves  
1Max  
1 tit it it t it t it Y it it t it t itx
p x W L r K L A x W L r K
s
α αα −Π = − − = − −− .    (7) 
By solving above problem, we have the monopolist’s choice of intermediate-good output 
itx  and economy’s final output tY  as (see Appendix A):  
1
(1 ) 1  
tit x it t t Y
x A W r Lγ γ γ α− − − −⎡ ⎤= Γ ⎣ ⎦ ,             (8) 
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1 1 1 (1 )( )t Y t t t tY Q A L K




1 1Y x xs s
αγ α αγ
ααγ α α γγ α α
− − +






αγγα γ γ −−⎡ ⎤Γ = −⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦ ; [ ]max{ ,  0 ,  }t it tA A i Q≡ ∈  is the leading-edge technology at 
date t ; and Γ  is determined by the distribution of technology over intermediate sectors. 
Following Howitt’s assumption that the distribution of relative productivity parameters, 
it it ta A A≡ , across entire society is converging to an invariant distribution as 
( ) ( ) 1Pr ita a F a a σ≤ = ≡ , then 
( ) 11 11
1
0
1 (1 )( ) 1
1
a f a da
α γ
α α γσ α
−− −
− − −⎡ ⎤Γ ≡ = +⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦∫ , whereσ  is a 
parameter measuring the impact of each vertical innovation on the stock of public 
knowledge (see subsection 3.1.5 below). 
In intermediate sectors, an intermediate-good producer enjoys a positive profit flow 
under the protection of exclusive usage of the innovation by law until the good becomes 
obsolete. Under the steady-state conditions, from the solution to maximization problem in 
equation (7), we have the profit flow of intermediate-good producer who produces the 
good with a technology of vintage t  at date s  as 
11 (1 ) exp ( )
1 1ts t t Lx
A y g g s t
s
αγα α α
− ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞Π = − Γ − −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥− −⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦  ,      (10) 
where ( )t t t ty Y Q A≡  is the productivity-adjusted output. The profit flow of intermediate 





s− by intermediate-good-purchase subsidy. So 
the monopolist tends to produce more compared with non-intervention. 
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3.1.3. Vertical Innovation 
A successful vertical innovation improves the quality of an existing intermediate 
good by replacing the current technology with a new leading-edge technology. The 
successful innovator becomes the temporary monopolist until the arrival of the next 
successful innovation in that sector. Assume that vertical innovation follows a Poisson 
process with the arrival rate tφ  given by 
vt




φ λ λ= = ,                (11) 
where t vt tn N Y≡  is the proportion of final output invested in vertical R&D; vλ is the 
productivity parameter of vertical innovation, it illuminates the difficulty to create a 
leading-edge technology and is assumed to be constant overtime. The vertical R&D 
expenditure vtN  is deflated by leading-edge productivity parameter tA  to take into account 
the increasing complexity of innovation as technology progresses, and is deflated by 
sector number tQ  to reflect the influence of increasing range of intermediate goods.
19 The 
expected number of vertical innovations occurring at date t  is t tQφ  with the consideration 
that there are tQ  sectors undertaking vertical R&D at the same time. 
Different from Howitt (1999), this work assumes that the government subsidizes 
vertical and horizontal R&D expenditures at proportional rates vs  and hs  respectively in 
order to encourage private investment in R&D.20 A vertical R&D firm maximizes its 
                                                 
19 The same amount of vertical R&D expenditure is spent in each intermediate sector because the expected 
return on vertical R&D investment is the same in all sectors. Thus, the larger is the range of intermediate 
sectors, the less vertical R&D expenditure is available for each sector holding other things constant. 
20 Howitt (1999) assumes that the government subsidizes both vertical and horizontal R&D expenditures at 
a same proportional rate β. This work uses two R&D subsidy rates because it contains several other policy 
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profit by choosing its vertical R&D expenditure vt tN Q as ( )max 1
vt
t vt v vt tN
V s N Qφ − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , 
where vtV  is the expected value of a vertical innovation. The expected value of a vertical 
innovation at date t  is the expected discounted profit earned before it is replaced, as 
( )exp svt tst tV r d dsτ τφ τ∞ ⎡ ⎤= − + Π⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ . Substituting (10) and imposing the steady-state 










s r g g
α α
αγφ α
−− Γ= − + + −−
.             (12) 
In (12), the discount rate in the denominator includes four items: the interest rate r , the 
vertical innovation’s arrival rateφ , the rate of gradual “crowding out” ( )1gαγ α− due to 
rising wage induced by the increasing scarcity of labor in final sector, and the effect of 
population growth to vertical innovator’s profit Lg− .22 For 0tn > , putting equation (12) 
into the vertical innovator’s maximization problem, the first-order condition can be 
derived as  










−− Γ = − −
+ + −−
.           (13) 
The left-hand side of this equation expresses the expected marginal benefit of vertical 
R&D; the right-hand side is the after-subsidy marginal cost of vertical R&D. 
                                                                                                                                                 
parameters and a uniform R&D subsidy rate is not enough to show the relationships between R&D 
encouragement and other kinds of government policy. 
21Equation (12) holds only in the steady-state equilibrium. This work does not analyze the transitional 
dynamics of the model economy and only focuses on the steady states. 
22 The last term, the effect of population growth, does not appear in Howitt (1999) because labor is not used 
to produce final good in his model. 
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3.1.4. Horizontal Innovation 
A successful horizontal innovation creates a new intermediate sector; its innovator 
becomes the monopolist in his newly created intermediate sector until his product is 
replaced by a vertical innovation occurring in this sector. We assume discovery rate of 




Ψ= , where tQ  represents the time change 
rate of the number of intermediate sectors. Similar to vertical R&D, the inputs, htN  
and tY , in horizontal R&D are deflated by the leading-edge productivity parameter. More 
specifically, we assume ( , )ht tN YΨ  is a constant-returns-to-scale function with Cobb-
Douglas form of 1( , )ht t h ht tN Y N Y
η ηλ −Ψ = , where hλ  is the productivity parameter of 
horizontal R&D, and 0 1η< < . Then, we have 
( , )ht t
t h t t t
t
N YQ h y Q
A
ηλΨ= = .              (14) 
where t ht th N Y≡  is the proportion of final output invested in horizontal R&D. This 
assumption implies that the average productivity of horizontal R&D input t htQ N  is a 
decreasing function of the fraction of final output allocated to horizontal R&D, th . 
Similar to vertical innovator, the horizontal innovator maximizes his profit by 
choosing the optimal level of horizontal R&D effort. The problem of a horizontal R&D 
innovator is ( )max 1
vt
t ht h htN
QV s N⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦ , where htV  is the expected value of a horizontal 
innovation, hs  is subsidy rate to horizontal R&D. We assume that the productivity of a 
newly created intermediate good is drawn randomly from the productivity distribution of 
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existing intermediate goods. So the expected value of a horizontal innovation is 
calculated according to ( ) ( )1 11ht it t vtV E A A Vα γα− −−⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . For 0th > , the first-order condition 
for this maximization problem is 








ηα α λ η
αγφ α
−− = − −
+ + −−
.           (15) 
Equation (15) states that the expected marginal benefit of horizontal R&D equals its 













− −= Γ − ; it says the steady-state value of horizontal R&D input th  is 
independent of the growth rate in decentralized economy. Instead, it is determined by the 








− , and other exogenous 
parameters such as vλ and hλ . 
3.1.5. Knowledge Spillover 
Following Caballero and Jaffe (1993) and Howitt (1999), the growth in leading-edge 
productivity parameter tA  results from the knowledge spillovers from vertical 
innovations. More specifically, the growth rate of technology is assumed to be 
proportional to the rate of vertical discovery:  
t




σ φ σφ= = = i , 0σ >              (16) 
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where Ag  is the growth rate of the productivity of the leading-edge technology, 
and 0σ > is a given knowledge spillover parameter reflecting the marginal impact of a 
vertical innovation on the entire public knowledge stock. Each innovation’s marginal 
impact on technological growth depends negatively on the number of intermediate goods 
because as the number of intermediate goods rises, an innovation of any intermediate 
sector will have a smaller impact on the whole economy. But the growing number of 
intermediate sectors counteracts this effect by bringing more innovations. 
We assume the productivity of a newly created intermediate good is randomly drawn 
from the distribution of the existing intermediate goods and the productivity distribution 
of new intermediate goods is identical to the productivity distribution of existing 
intermediate goods. Thus the distribution of relative productivity 0 1ita< <  converges to 
the invariant distribution ( ) ( ) 1Pr ita a F a a σ≤ = ≡ . In long run, it follows 
( ) ( )1 11it tE A A α γα− −−⎡ ⎤ = Γ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . 
3.1.6 Physical Capital Accumulation 
For physical capital accumulation, we assume that each unit of unused final good can 
be viewed as one unit of physical capital and there is no depreciation. Since from (2), 
final output is allocated among R&D expenditures, consumption, and investment in 
physical capital, so the stock of physical capital evolves over time according to  
t t vt ht tK Y N N C
• = − − − .               (17) 
This equation also represents the final-good market clearing condition. 
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3.2. Preferences 
We assume each household lives forever and the representative household has 
identical intertemporally additive preferences over consumption with a constant rate of 












−∫ i ,              (18) 
where tC  is the household’s consumption at time t , tL  is the size of population, ε is the 
elasticity of marginal utility of consumption. 
We assume that the government imposes a capital-income tax kτ , and a lump-sum 
tax tT  on the households, and provides an investment subsidy ks to encourage private 
investment in physical capital. This model uses two capital-oriented policies to control 
the household’s income allocation, because the investment subsidy and capital-income 
tax affect the incentive of capital holding from two different aspects. Capital-income tax 
affects the incentive of holding current capital stock, tK , by changing the per unit capital 
income. In this model, capital stock and consumption good is convertible, so household 
could change his capital holding position by adjusting consumption at given time. 
Investment subsidy affects the incentive of capital investment, tK , by changing the its 
cost. And the lower is the cost, the higher the investment. Both policies have growth 
effect because they affect the evolvement of steady-state growth path of capital stock.  
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At each time, household keeps his income and expense balanced. His income includes 
wage and after-tax capital income, his expense includes consumption, lump-sum tax 
payment and investment. A representative household’s budget constraint is23  
( ) ( ){ }1 1 11t t k t k L t t tkK W r s g K C Ts τ= + − − − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦− .       (19) 
where tK  is per capita capital asset, tT  is per capita lump-sum tax, Lg  is the growth rate 
of population tL . Equation (19) assumes that all income is either invested or consumed by 
household, and the capital income is adjusted by capital-income tax and the effect of 
population growth. Solving a representative household’s maximization problem provides 









⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞−= −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦

.               (20) 
Equation (20) reflects the shadow price of consumption relative to potential gains 
from investment. Increase of capital-income tax rate will reduce the growth of per capita 
consumption by reducing after-tax return for capital. Because if after-tax capital return is 
reduced, more capital is needed to gain the same level of income and less final good is 
left for consumption. Decrease of investment subsidy rate will also reduce its growth rate 
because the decrease results in a lower growth of capital stock and eventually lower 
                                                 
23  The aggregate budget constraint of households in economy is ( ) ( )1 1t t k t t t t k tW L r K C T s Kτ+ − = + + −  , 
where 
tC  is the aggregate consumption, tK  is the stock of physical capital. Its left-hand side is households’ 
incomes, while the right-hand side is his expenses. Divided both sides by population and rearranged, the 
budget constraint can be expressed on individual terms as in (19). 
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future final output available for consumption. The overall effect is determined by the 






3.3. Government Budget Constraint 
The government aims to enhance decentralized economic growth through government 
interventions. Meanwhile, at any given time, it should satisfy a budget constraint as  
0
tQ
k t t t k t x it it v vt h htr K T s K s p x di s N s Nτ + = + + +∫ .         (21) 
The equation’s left-hand side is government income obtained from capital-income tax 
k t tr Kτ  and lump-sum tax tT ; the right-hand side is government expenditure on investment 
subsidy k ts K , intermediate-good-purchase subsidy 0
tQ
x it its p x di∫ , vertical R&D subsidy 
v vts N  and horizontal R&D subsidy h hts N . We assume equation (21) holds at all time 
because government cannot finance its deficit or to lend out its surplus through 
alternative channels in this model. 
3.4. Steady-State Equilibrium and Results of Decentralized Economy 
The results of this study rely crucially on the availability of steady-state conditions. If 
such conditions are unavailable, these discussions are worthless. In the steady-state 













= . Stationary is also imposed on the fraction of 
final output allocated to vertical R&D tn , the fraction of final output allocated to 
horizontal R&D th , and interest rate tr . In addition, the per capita output t tY L , the 
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number of intermediate goods tQ , and the leading-edge productivity tA  are assumed to 
grow at constant rates g , Qg , Ag , respectively. Following equation (9), the productivity-
adjusted output is  
1 1
t Y t ty Q L k
α αγ α αγ α αγ− − − + −= Γ Γ .               (22) 
Since ty , tk  is stationary, 
1
t tQ L
αγ α αγ− − +  must be stationary by equation (22), the relationship 





− += .                   (23) 
This equation says it is the growth of the variety of intermediate goods that works as the 
important channel to offset the scale effects caused by ever-increasing population. Unlike 
the original model of Howitt (1999), here the number of intermediate goods grows faster 
than the population. Its reason is explained clearly in Zeng and Zhang (2002).24 And we 
will show in next chapter that the steady-state value Qg  is same in decentralized and 
social planner’s economy.  




= and equation (23), the growth rate 
of leading-edge productivity must satisfy  
                                                 
24 Their paper explains the reason as “On the one hand, by construction, the equilibrium labor employment 
in all intermediate sectors, 
0
tQ
itL di∫ , equals the average labor employment in each intermediate sector, ( )0 tQ it tL di Q∫ , times the number of intermediate sectors, tQ . On the other hand, the labor market 
clearing condition requires that the equilibrium labor employment in all intermediate sectors must grow at 
the same rate as the population, Lg . We can easily verify that the average labor employment in each 
intermediate sector grows more slowly than the population. As a result, the number of intermediate sectors 
must grow faster than the population”. 
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1
A Lg g g
α
αγ
−= − .                 (24) 
Equation (24) shows the growth rate of leading-edge productivity depends positively on 
the growth rate of per capita final output while negatively on the growth rate of 
population. Because the number of intermediate goods increases much faster than 
population, the growth of R&D input to each intermediate sector should be slower than 
the growth of per capita output, so the growth rate of leading-edge technology must be 
slower than economic growth. And more specifically, the difference between g  and Ag  
equals the difference between Qg  and Lg , i.e., A Q Lg g g g− = − . 







− += .                (25)   
In equation (25), the productivity-adjusted output positively relates to the population 
growth rate and negatively to the horizontal R&D intensity. At the steady states, growth 
rate of per capita consumption is the same as that of per capita output, so from equation 





sr gε ρ τ
−= + − .                  (26) 
From equation (16), we get the steady-state value of Agφ σ= . Substituting (24) into it, 
vertical innovation’s arrival rate can be expressed as 1 1A Lg g g
αφ σ σ αγσ
−= = − . 
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Putting all above information together into equation (13) (15), we have the following 
two equilibrium conditions that determine the per capita output growth, g , and the 
proportional allocation to horizontal R&D, h : 
Decentralized Vertical R&D Condition     (V) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1 1
1 1











λ α αγ α σ α αγ
ρ ε αγ αλ γ τ τ σ α αγσ
− + − + − +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ = − −⎧ ⎫− −⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞−⎪ ⎪+ + + − +⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎜ ⎟− − − ⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
   
 
Decentralized Horizontal R&D Condition    (H) 
( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1
1 1











η α α αγ
ρ ε αγ αγ τ τ σ α αγσ
− − + = − −⎧ ⎫− −⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞−⎪ ⎪+ + + − +⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎜ ⎟− − − ⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
    
Both R&D conditions imply that growth rate g  is negative related with horizontal R&D 
input intensity h , i.e., 0g
h





∂ >∂  in both equation (V) and (H). This negative 
influence of the horizontal R&D intensity h  on the growth of per capita output g  arises 
because horizontal R&D intensity has a negative effect on the productivity-adjusted final 
output y  shown in equation (25). This negative effect lowers the arrival rate and the 
profit flow of a successful vertical innovator through equation (11) and (12), and thus 
discourages investment in vertical R&D. So in h g− space, equation (V) and (H) are two 
download-sloping lines that meet at the equilibrium point. Equation (V) and (H) together 










− −= Γ − , 
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which is a horizontal line passing through the equilibrium point ( *h , *g ) (See Figure 1). 
Thus, the equilibrium value of horizontal R&D input intensity could completely be 
determined only by exogenous parameters, while the economic growth rate should be 
determined by the two-arbitrage conditions. 
Inspecting the denominators of equation (V) and (H), and noting that the population 
growth rate Lg  is exogenously given, we can see that there exists a unique steady-state 








− ⎛ ⎞−> +⎜ ⎟− ⎝ ⎠ . This is because the 
two lines are both monotonously decreasing but with different slopes. More specifically, 





⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ = >⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ , which implies the slope of vertical R&D condition is smaller. 
And because both slopes of the two lines are negative, thus the vertical R&D condition is 
steeper. So if h  is below *h , the horizontal R&D condition is above the vertical R&D 
condition; while if above *h , the horizontal R&D condition lies below the vertical R&D 
condition. Therefore, the two lines should intersect at a unique point as described above. 
The requirement that ρ  is very small is used to guarantee that growth rate g is positive; 








− ⎛ ⎞−> +⎜ ⎟− ⎝ ⎠  here to make sure that the denominators of 
(H) and (V) are always positive. 
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From the results above, five policy parameters appear in decentralized equilibrium 
conditions (V) and (H) and have growth effects on decentralized economy, including 
capital-income tax rate kτ , intermediate-good-purchase subsidy rate xs , investment 
subsidy rate ks , vertical R&D subsidy rate vs , and horizontal R&D subsidy rates hs . 
Lump-sum tax absents and has only level effect on decentralized economy. Capital-
income tax and investment subsidy take effects on long-run growth equilibrium through 
changing marginal return of capital, which could affect households’ incentive of capital 
holding and investment. Intermediate-good-purchase subsidy can be used not only to 
enhance growth, but also to improve the level of final output by equation (9). Because 
innovation is the engine of economic growth in this model, so adjusting the production 
incentive of research firms can influence growth of the whole society as expected, and 







Figure 1: Decentralized Steady-state Equilibrium 
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with public expenditure. In sum, capital income tax, together with investment, 
intermediate-good-purchase and R&D subsidies, are potential government instruments to 
regulate the decentralized growth toward its socially optimal path.  
3.5. Steady-State Solutions for Other Variables 
As mentioned above, horizontal R&D input intensity h  can be obtained 
simultaneously with growth rate g  through decentralized R&D conditions. For clarity, it 
can be rewritten as  
( )
( )









−⎧ ⎫− − +⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪= +⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥− −⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
.         (27) 
After decentralized growth rate is made clear by arbitrage equations, other variables such 
as productivity-adjusted consumption and productivity-adjusted capital stock also could 
be clarified by their steady-state conditions.  In other words, they can be written as in 
term of the growth rate g , the steady-state value of productivity-adjusted output y , or 
other known variables. First step is to get clear expression of y  using known variables 







− += .               (28) 
where h  is specified by equation (27) and other parameters are exogenous. Then 
immediately through equation (11), (16) and (24), steady-state value of vertical R&D 








⎛ ⎞−= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ .              (29) 
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Substituting the equation (26), which gives out the equilibrium value of interest rate r , 
into equation (A.6), the steady-state solution of productivity-adjusted capital stock can be 
obtained as 










− −= + − − .            (30) 
Equation (30) implies the higher is the capital-income tax, the lower the productivity-
adjusted capital stock; while a higher investment subsidy rate or a higher intermediate-
good-purchase rate could push up the level of productivity-adjusted capital stock. 
From the household’s budget constraint, we find out that aggregate consumption can 
be rewritten as ( ) ( )1 1t t t k t t k t tC W L r K s K Tτ= + − − − − . Putting equation (30) and (A.5) 
into it and expressing in productivity-adjusted terms, we get 
( ) ( )( )
2






τα γα α γ βε ρ
⎡ ⎤−⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+= − + + − − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− − +⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
,     (31) 
where T Yβ ≡  is the ratio of lump-sum tax to final output. Lump-sum tax serves to 
balance the government budget sheet, so β  can be obtained from government budget 










s sg g s n s h
s s g s
α γ τ αβ τε ρ
⎡ ⎤− − += − + + +⎢ ⎥− − + −⎣ ⎦
.     (32) 
This equation shows the lump-sum tax should satisfy the relationship of 
0
tQ
t k t x it it v vt h ht k t tT s K s p x di s N s N r Kτ= + + + −∫  or government income from taxes should 
equal with government expenses to subsidies. 
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4. Social Planner’s Solutions 
Because decentralized equilibrium does not produce optimal outcomes and because 
the government has potential to adjust the economy to socially optimal growth, the social 
planner’s equilibrium is used as the reference point to evaluate government policies. 
Social planner seeks to maximize the aggregate utility of households in equation (17), 
subject to the economy’s final output distribution constraint, t vt ht t tY N N C K
•= + + + . In 
social planner’s case, there is no consideration on individual household’s preference or 
individual producer’s profit as in the decentralized economy; the only aim is to maximize 
the overall social welfare. The social planner’s problem can be decomposed into two 
parts: one part is a static problem dealing with the production decisions of final good and 
intermediate goods at any given time t , and the other part is a dynamic one solving the 
optimal time paths of variables such as per capita capital asset, leading-edge productivity 
and variety of intermediate goods. 
4.1. Steady-State Equilibrium Results of Social Planner’s Economy 
At any given time t , the social planner’s decision of inputs and outputs is a static 
problem, and the intertemporal outputs are influenced by the economy’s inherent 
attributes, such as the production technologies, accumulated public knowledge stock, the 
population size, and so on. By allocating optimal amount of resources to each 
intermediate sector and final sector, the social planner manages to maximize the final 
output and total social surplus at that time. Meanwhile, the social planner’s economy is 
restricted by the labor and capital constraints as well as available production 




max   t
t
Q
t Y it itY L A x di
α α−= ∫                      
1






−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
                                
tY 0
          L t
Q
it tL di L+ =∫  
0
          t
Q
it tK di K=∫ . 
Setting up an ordinary Lagrangian and solving it, we have the socially optimal choices of 
productions at any given time t  (see Appendix C): 
( ) ( )1 11 1t Y t t t tY Q A L Kα α γα αγ α αγ− −− + − +′= Γ Γ ,                    (33) 
( ) ( ) 11 1 11it x t it t t tx Q A A L Kγ α αγ γ γα− − + −−′= Γ Γ ,                      (34) 
where ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 11 1Y αγ α α αγαγ α α αγ− − − +′Γ = − − + and ( ) ( )1x γ γαγ α αγ −′Γ = − + . Equation 
(33) points out that available capital stock, population, leading-edge technology, and 
variety of intermediate goods are determinants of final-good production at any given time 
t . Equation (34) reveals that output of a particular intermediate good is positively related 
with its relative productivity parameter, which represents its technological vintage. 
Dynamically, social planner must make further choices to make capital stock tK , 
productivity of leading-edge technology tA  and number of intermediate goods tQ  
evolving along their optimal time paths. For this purpose, social planner should control 
the allocation of final output among consumption, R&D inputs, and physical capital 
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investment. Using the above results from static problem directly, the social planner’s 








t CU e L dt
ερ
ε
−∞ −= −∫ , 
( ) ( ) ( )1 11 1S.T.     1t t t Y t t t t t tK n h Q A L K C Lα α γα αγ α αγ− −− + − +′= − − Γ Γ − ,     (35)    
t v t t tA n Y Qσλ= ,                    (36) 
t h t t tQ h Y A
ηλ= .                                              (37)         
Equation (35) is derived from equation (33) and (17); equation (36) is derived from 
equation (10) and (15); equation (37) is derived from equation (13). Thus, the current-
value Hamiltonian function for the social planner’s optimization problem can be written 
as 
( ) ( ) ( )
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v t t t h t t t
C L n h Q A L K C L
n Y Q h Y A
ε α α γα αγ α αγ
η
θε
θ σλ θ λ
− − −− + − +⎡ ⎤′Η = + − − Γ Γ −⎣ ⎦−
+ +
, 
where tK , tA  and tQ  serve as state variables; tC , tn  and th  act as control variables; 1θ , 
2θ  and 3θ  are co-state variables regarding to capital tK , technology tA  and intermediate 
industry variety tQ  respectively. Then solving the maximum principles, we obtain the 
steady-state conditions of social planner’s choices on capital accumulation and R&D 
input intensities (see Appendix D): 




α γ η ε ρ−⎡ ⎤− + − = +⎣ ⎦ ,                         (38)  
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( )( ){ }11 1 1 1v t t Qh y g gσλ α αγ α γ η ε ρ−⎡ ⎤− + − + − − = + −⎣ ⎦ ,         (39) 
( )( )1 11 1 1h t t t Ah n h y g gηλ η α η α ε ρ− −⎡ ⎤− − + − − = + −⎣ ⎦ .       (40) 
Equation (38), (39) and (40) are the physical capital accumulation condition, the vertical 
R&D condition, and the horizontal R&D condition of social planner’s equilibrium 
respectively. From equation (38), because both sides are positive and 1t ty k > , it 
requires ( )1ρ α γ< −  to make sure that growth rate gets positive value for 0th > . 
4.2. Balanced Growth Properties 
At the steady-state equilibrium, stationary is imposed on the productivity-adjusted 
final output, fractions of final output allocated to vertical and horizontal R&D. Per capita 
final output, population size, number of intermediate goods and leading-edge productivity 
are assumed to grow at constant rates g， Lg ， Qg  and Ag  respectively. The equation 
(38) implies that capital stock and final output are growing synchronously as 
t t t t LY Y K K g g= = +  . From equation (33), we get 1Q Lg gα αγαγ





≡ , Ag  must satisfy the relationship of Q A Lg g g g= + − , thus 
1
A Lg g g
α
αγ
−= −  in the social planner’s economy.25 
From equation (36) and (37), we get Q h A vy g h g n
ηλ σλ= =  or A h Q vn g h gηλ σλ= , 
which says that horizontal R&D and vertical R&D should progress in coordinate paces.  
                                                 
25 Note these relationships are same in decentralized and social planner’s economy following equation (9) 
and (33), although the two equations have different implications. 
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Summarizing all information together and putting into equation (39) and (40), we obtain 
the social planner’s choice of vertical R&D input intensity and optimal economic growth 
rate described by following equations:  
     Social Planner’s Vertical R&D Condition     (V') 
( )( ){ }11 11 1 1 1v L L
h
g h g g
hη
σλα αγ α αγα αγ α γ η ε ραγ λ αγ
−− + − +⎡ ⎤− + − + − − = + −⎣ ⎦   
      Social Planner’s Horizontal R&D Condition     (H')         
( )( ) ( )1
1
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−
−⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥− + −− − + − − = − + +⎢ ⎥− +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
We assume that ρ  is small enough and ( ) 11 1 0v
h
σλα γ η λ
−− − >  to guarantee growth 
rate to be positive when 0 1h< < : from equation (V') and (H'), when h  is very small, g  
will have positive value if ρ  is small enough; when h  is going bigger, says h  is near 1, 
( ) 11 1 0v
h
σλα γ η λ
−− − >  should be used to make sure the existence of social planner’s 
equilibrium. The first assumption implies that household’s perceptions on current and 
future consumptions have only moderate difference, and the second implies that the 
productivities of vertical and horizontal R&D are stable and a vertical innovation has 
only limited or non-drastic effect, instead of revolutionary effect, on knowledge stock. 
According to equation (V'), the growth rate of per capita output g  negatively relates 
with the horizontal R&D input intensity h , because 0g
h
∂ <∂  if 0 1α< < , 0 1η< <  and 
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∂ >∂ , equation (V') is a 
monotonic decreasing convex line in h-g space (See figure 2). Its reason is in this model 
the marginal productivity of horizontal R&D input intensity, 1vh
ηηλ − , is a decreasing 
function of h , while the marginal productivity of vertical R&D input intensity is assumed 
to be a constant vλ . From the consideration of returns from R&D investment, the higher 
is the proportion allocated to horizontal R&D, the lower the average marginal 
productivity of overall R&D input, and then the lower is economic growth. So the growth 
rate is expected to go down when horizontal R&D intensity goes up. There is a more 
intuitive explanation: if the share of horizontal R&D input increases, the pie left for 
vertical R&D input and capital accumulation must decrease, but the alternatives are more 
powerful engines to drive the economy to a higher growth rate.  
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In the social planner’s horizontal R&D condition (H'), the sign of 


















− − −∂ =∂ − −
 is implicit. But if h  is small enough, 2h−  is 
much bigger than 2hη−  as 0η > , then 0g
h
∂ <∂  as numerator is positive and denominator 
goes is negative when 0 1α< <  and 0 1ε< < . By assuming Qg  and Ag  are stationary, 





∂ >∂  if h  is small enough and 0
g
h
∂ <∂ . So in h-g space, within the 
narrow range where h  is close to 0, (H') is a curve beginning with a negative slope and 
becomes less and less steeper as h  increasing, but the overall behavior of horizontal 
R&D condition still relies on value of parameters. The reason is straightforward: from the 
consideration of horizontal R&D investment, if the horizontal R&D input is very low or 
even zero, a small increase will lead to a significant impact on economy, but as h  going 
up, this stimulus is flagging out. A simulated graph of (H') with above properties is 
plotted in the Figure 3 which shows horizontal R&D can be a dominant force of growth 
until reaching the level where the marginal benefits for both kinds of innovations are 
equalized, then as h  goes even higher, growth rate becomes less and less sensitive to its 
increase, because the opportunity cost of continually undertaking horizontal innovation is 
already too high. 
Putting the two curves together, there exists a unique equilibrium in social planner’s 
economy if parameter values are suitable. Figure 3 plots the behavior of the social 
planner’s arbitrage conditions with 0.4α = , 0.6γ = , 0.3ε = , 0.05σ = , 0.4η = , 
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0.04ρ = , 0.5vλ =  and 0.5hλ = , i.e., 1v hλ λ = , 0.013Lg = , the average world 
population growth rate from 1995 to 2000.  

























Vertical R&D Condition 
Horizontal R&D Condition 
 
 
In above figure, the two lines meet at the equilibrium point (0.0359, 0.0620). Parameter 
analysis (see Appendix E) shows that social planner’s equilibria exist in the 
neighborhood of this given parameter set, and it implies that this equilibrium is stable in 
that any parameter fluctuation only shifts the equilibrium gradually.  
4.3. Steady-State Solutions for Other Variables  
Similar to the decentralized economy, steady-state solutions for other variables can be 
derived after growth rate g  and horizontal R&D input intensity h  are determined by 
Figure 3: Social Planner’s Equilibrium  
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social planner’s R&D conditions (V') and (H'). Following the similar procedures as in 






− += , and 








⎛ ⎞−= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ .               (41) 
From equation (38), steady-state capital stock in the social planner’s economy is  





−⎡ ⎤− + −⎣ ⎦= + .              (42) 
It shows that the optimal physical capital is determined by the opportunity cost of capital 
investment, which is measured by alternative returns from R&D input. 
Substituting h , n  and equation (35) into t vt ht t tY N N C K
•= + + + , we solve out the 
steady-state result of productivity-adjusted consumption as 
( ) ( )11 1 1 1 Lg gc n h h ygα γ η ε ρ−⎧ ⎫+⎡ ⎤= − − − − + −⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦ +⎩ ⎭ .                  (43) 
where h , g , y , n  are known. Equation (43) means consumption is the fraction of final 
output after R&D inputs and physical capital investment. 
 
 41
5. Comparison and Government Policy Implications 
The incentives of decentralized productions and investments are distorted compared 
with those of social planner’s economy. The reasons of these distortions in this model are 
expatiated as follow. First, the externalities of innovations in decentralized economy 
cause the difference between the values of vertical innovations in the two economies 
because the social planner takes into account all effects of an innovation while the 
innovator does not consider its externalities. The situation is more complicated here 
because this model contains both positive and negative R&D externalities. The 
knowledge spillover effect, as discussed in subsection 3.1.5, is a positive externality and 
refers to that a vertical innovation has some positive impact on the entire knowledge 
stock, which is possessed by whole society and can be used by each member for free. 
This effect tends to generate insufficient R&D input and thus lower economic growth 
because vertical innovators undervalue their innovations under this effect by neglecting 
their contributions to public knowledge stock and their benefits to thereafter innovations. 
The creative destruction effect is a negative externality and refers to that an innovation 
will supplant a current-existing product and the previous producer will suffer permanent 
losses from being obsolesced. Creative destruction effect tends to induce too much R&D 
input and thus higher economic growth because private innovators overestimate the 
values of vertical innovations under this effect since they do not internalize the losses of 
previous monopolists caused by their innovations. The net effect of the two externalities 
will determine the overall tendency of decentralized vertical R&D input in this model. 
Second, as discussed in subsection 3.1.2, the monopolist restricts his output supplied to 
final-good production to maximize his monopolistic profit in every intermediate sector. 
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Thus, the final output of decentralized economy cannot reach socially optimal level if 
there is no encouraging government intervention such as subsidy to intermediate-good 
purchase, which will increase the monopolistic outputs of intermediate goods.26 Third, 
the values of horizontal innovations are also distorted because they are measured 
according to the technology distribution among intermediate sectors together with the 
values of vertical innovations (see subsection 3.1.4), which are distorted as reasons 
above. Therefore, horizontal R&D may not be invested by optimal amount. Fourth, 
capital investment and consumption may not follow their optimal paths when final output 
and R&D investments are not optimal, because household’s incentives of income 
allocation are different from those of social planner under this situation. Therefore, the 
decentralized economy in this model does not necessarily produce socially optimal 
growth because of above distortions. For example, using the same parameter values as in 
the simulation of chapter 4, if there is no government intervention ( 0v h x ks s s s= = = =  
and 0kτ β= = ), the decentralized steady-state value of horizontal R&D input intensity is 
0.1660DCh = , much higher than that of social planner’s equilibrium. The decentralized 
steady-state value of growth rate is 0.0313DCg = , 12.8% lower than social planner’s 
result 0.0359SPg = . Because of the above considerations, results from the social 
planner’s equilibrium are employed as the benchmark to judge the policy effects on the 
decentralized economy.  
According to the analysis of decentralized equilibrium in Chapter 3, capital-income 
tax, vertical and horizontal R&D subsidies, investment subsidy, intermediate-good-
                                                 
26 This is similar to but not exactly same as the appropriability effect described in “Endogenous Growth 
Theory”, chapter 2. The effect reflects the private monopolists’ inability to appropriate the whole output 
flow. 
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purchase subsidy are potential government instruments to adjust the decentralized 
economic growth to synchronously follow its socially optimal path. Because these policy 
parameters appear in decentralized R&D conditions (V) and (H), all of them will have 
growth effects on decentralized economy. Contrarily, the lump-sum tax has only level 
effect and serves to balance the government budget sheet. Generally speaking, if the 
decentralized growth is lower than its social optimum, government should encourage 
investment and production, including physical capital investment, R&D investments, and 
intermediate-good production. To encourage physical capital investment, government can 
reduce capital income tax rate kτ  or increase the investment subsidy rate ks . To stimulate 
production in intermediate sectors, government can increase intermediate-good-purchase 
subsidy rate xs . To encourage R&D input, government can increase the untargeted R&D 
subsidy rate s , 27 or properly adjust the targeted R&D rates.  
Because the number of government policy parameters is relative small compared with 
the complexity of this model, it is unrealistic to guide the decentralized economy to attain 
social planner’s equilibrium from all aspects even it is mathematically possible. One 
reason is that this requirement may beyond the power of these policies, because policy 
parameters should have reasonable ranges such as 0 <1, , 0k x hs sτ< >  but completely all-
sided optimal outcomes may not be obtained within these ranges. Second, even if the 
socially optimal outcomes can be achieved through government interventions, the 
                                                 
27 Untargeted R&D subsidy means that R&D activities are not discriminated according to their types, 
technology contents, industries or any other attributes when the government undertakes his R&D subsidy 
policy. In this model, untargeted R&D subsidy means that the government equally treats vertical and 
horizontal R&D while subsidizing, i.e., v hs s s= = , where s  is the untargeted R&D subsidy rate. And 
targeted R&D subsidy means government distinguishes R&D activities according to their distinctive 
attributes and subsidizes them with different rates. Here, R&D activities are distinguished as vertical or 
horizontal. 
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policies can be chosen will become very rigid because the limitation of their variety. 
Thus, these policies are difficult to be executed in reality and very sensitive to 
environment shocks. Therefore, we emphasize on attaining optimal economic growth 
only, i.e., DC SPg g= , to get some flexibility on policy choices and executions in turn. 
5.1. Government Policies to Achieve Optimal Growth  
From the above discussion, the government policies chosen to achieve the overall 
social planner’s equilibrium are rigid and sensitive. So, this part mainly checks whether 
the optimal growth can be attained in decentralized economy or not, analyses how it can 
be attained, and then examines the channels and underpinnings through which these 
growth-enhancing policies take effects. In addition, it prefers to find suitable policies that 
lead to the optimal fractions of final output allocated to vertical and horizontal R&D 
investments since innovation is the growth engine in this R&D based model, but if 
without government interventions, specifically, vertical and horizontal R&D subsidies, 
the R&D input intensities always stay at un-optimized levels, so we’d better also look for 
allocation-improving policies to ensure R&D sectors are optimally invested. 
Following the ordinary method, substituting equation (27) into (V) or (H) and 
rearranging, we have the relationship between policy parameters and economic growth 
rate: 
( ) ( )( )
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 is a positive constant 
affected only by exogenous parameters. 
R&D subsidy policy should be discussed separately according to whether it is 
targeted or not. If the government employs an untargeted R&D subsidy, i.e., v hs s s= = , 
its effect on h  is offset because the marginal costs of vertical and horizontal R&D will 
change in same direction with same proportion under this condition, thus h  cannot be 
optimized as ( ) 11h vh ηη λ λ −= Γ . Put v hs s s= =  into (44), we have 
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.  (45) 
Therefore, the untargeted R&D subsidy rate is determined by exogenous parameters 
including technology distributionΓ , population growth rate Lg , and so on, and it is also 
interacted with other policies, including production encouragement policy represented 






− .  The growth rate is positively 
related with s , i.e., 0g
s
∂ >∂ . Without considering other policies, equation (45) can be 




s M g gαγ αρ ε σ α αγσ
−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞−⎛ ⎞− = + + + − +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
, thus there is a unique 
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value of s  to make DC SPg g= . Following the simulation in Chapter 4, growth rate will 
reach the social planner’s level if 0.8228s = , but h  still stays at 0.1660. 
If the government uses targeted subsidy policy, h  can be optimized by adjusting the 




∂ >∂  and 0v
h
s
∂ <∂  from equation (27). And 





∂ <∂ , while it will increase when vs  increases, i.e., 0v
g
s
∂ >∂  [also see 
Segerstrom (2000)].28 Figure 4 shows the impact of an increase of vs  on the steady-state 
equilibrium, and the impacts of hs  changes are similar. 
 
                                                 
28 Segerstrom’s paper provides a generalized version of Howitt (1999) R&D-driven growth model, and 











To ensure R&D sectors are allocated with optimal fractions of final output, it requires 
to satisfy DC SPg g=  together with DC SPh h= , if there is no other government 
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have a unique value to satisfy the first relationship above, and in addition, both subsidy 
rates, vs  and hs , are determined when h  is optimized in the second equation. Following 
the previous example, if other policy parameters are set to 0, the social planner’s 
equilibrium point (0.0359, 0.0620) can be attained when 0.7221vs =  and 0.4983hs = . 
To discuss the growth effects of capital-oriented policies, we have: 















α αγρ ε τ αγσ σ α
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−
⎡ ⎤−− ⎛ ⎞− ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥+ = = + + − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥− −⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠− −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
.  (46) 




∂ <∂ and 0k
g
s
∂ >∂ for 
all 0g > holding other parameters constantly, in other words, an increase of capital-
income tax or a decrease of investment subsidy will reduce economic growth, and 
changes of capital-oriented policies have no effect on horizontal R&D input intensity. 
Figure 5 shows the impact of an increase of kτ on the steady-state equilibrium, and the 
impacts of ks  changes are similar.     
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Without considering other policies, equation (46) can be simplified as 
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−  to make DC SPg g= , while h cannot be changed by capital-oriented policies.
29 With 
the help of R&D subsidies, the requirements of DC SPg g=  and DC SPh h=  can be satisfied 






− =−  together 
with 0.6677vs = , 0.6hs = , decentralized growth rate can be pushed from 0.0313 to 0.0359 
and horizontal R&D input intensity is lowered from 0.1660 to 0.0620. 
 
 
                                                 
29 The value may beyond the reasonable area if 1 11
1 SP L
g M gαγ ασ α αγσ
⎛ ⎞−⎛ ⎞+ > + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
, in which
SPg  is determined 











Similarly, increase of intermediate-good-purchase subsidy rate xs  will cause the 




∂ >∂  for all 0g >  holding other conditions constant. 
Although intermediate-good-purchase subsidy has growth effect on economy, the main 
purpose of this policy is to adjust the output level of decentralized economy. Thus, its 
growth effect is not our focus.  
 Above policies take effects through different channels. First, the vertical and 
horizontal R&D subsidies take effects by changing the marginal cost of vertical and 
horizontal innovations through equation (13) and (15) respectively. Second, the capital-
oriented policies, capital-income tax and investment subsidy, can affect the steady-state 
interest rate through the time path of per capita consumption as in equation (20) and (26), 
then the interest rate takes part in the private discount rate of intermediate firms, and 
affects the values of innovations as in equation (12). Third, the intermediate-good-
purchase subsidy has impacts on the profit flows of existing monopolists in equation (10), 
then it can change the values of both vertical and horizontal innovations as in equation 
(13) and (15), at last, it takes part in the decentralized R&D conditions as a factor to 
affect marginal benefits of R&D. 
5.2. Lump-Sum Tax and Government Budget  
In this model, the lump-sum tax is discretionary in nature and is indiscriminately 
levied on households. It plays the important role to balance the government budget sheet 
otherwise the government may be exposed to the risk of deficit because of the absence of 
alternative financial channel. But its limitation should be noted. In addition to the 
government budget constraint, from household’s budget constraint, equation (19), we 
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have ( ) ( )1 1t t k t k t tT WL rK s K Cτ= + − − − − , which implies tT  should be no higher than 
households’ total income ( )1t k tWL rKτ+ −  to sustain a positive economic growth. 30 





τ τ γβ α α − +≤ − + − .               (47) 
Its right-hand side is always positive. Lump-sum tax should satisfy this relationship at the 
steady-state equilibrium from the requirement of economic growth. 
Furthermore the existence of zero lump-sum tax needs to be discussed for there is no 
lump-sum transfer among economic agents in social planner’s case. Lump-sum tax in 
nature is a collection and reallocation of social income for purpose of better social 
welfare, and in this model, it is also a mechanism to balancing government budget. So the 
zero lump-sum tax is used to analysis whether government could automatically balance 
its budget through designed growth-enhancing policies without such mechanism as lump-
sum transfer between economic agents. To discuss zero lump-sum tax, set 0β =  and put 







k k SP L x
k v h
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s g g s s n s h
s s g s
α γ τ ατ ε ρ
⎡ ⎤− − +− = + +⎢ ⎥− − + −⎣ ⎦
. Together with equation (46), this 
condition can be satisfied as the capital-oriented policies are specified. Thus, it’s possible 
for government to reach socially optimal growth without lump-sum tax when other 
policies are properly used if exogenous parameters are suitable. 
5.3. Other Economic Properties of the Model and Implications 
                                                 
30 When 0tT < , it turns to a lump-sum transfer from government to households. The decentralized economy 
is still able to attain socially optimal growth under this condition. 
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To better understand the difference between decentralized and social planner’s 
equilibria, this part will discuss several other important properties of this R&D driven 
model and their policy implications, and then briefly state the limitations of this model 
and the problems left by this work that need further analysis in future research.  
First, from the equation (9) and (33), the decentralized and socially optimal final 
outputs are different only in coefficients, YΓ  and Y′Γ . Other variables take part in the two 
functions in the same ways, which means that inherent attributes of economy are the 
determinant of production. If intermediate-good-purchase subsidy equals to zero, 
decentralized coefficient, YΓ , is always lower than the social planner’s, Y′Γ . The 
coefficient difference comes from how the market is organized and how the production is 
preceded; such difference has only level effect instead of growth effect on economy. It 
hints that the government can quantitatively achieve some degree of similarity to socially 
optimal output level through policies that reduce the market power of monopolists and 
introduce competition. To obtain DC SPY Y= , the government must comply the 








α αγαγ α α γα
α αγ
− +⎡ ⎤− + −⎛ ⎞ = ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟− − +⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦
. By observation, we note that the 
equation is satisfied if and only if 
1xs α= − ,                  (48) 
This is because both sides of the relationship are monotonously increasing with xs , (48) 
must be the unique solution. Equation (48) shows the government’s choice to promote 
output level through intermediate-good-purchase subsidy is rather rigid. And it reflects 
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the monopolistic market power of intermediate-good producers in the decentralized 
economy, and the parameter α  is just an inverse measure of such power. 
Second, in the decentralized economy, population growth and economic growth are 




∂ >∂ . This is because a faster population growth will force the 
economy to expand faster and exhibit a faster growth of industry variety as in equation 
(23). In the social planner’s case, the optimal growth rate is also shifted by the change of 





∂  is implicit. Therefore, although it seems that the 
economy with larger population tends to grow faster than the smaller one, it does not 
necessary have better welfare, because after the decentralized growth rate DCg  is pushed 
up by increase of population growth rate Lg , the social planner’s growth rate has already 
changed. 
Third, in this model, Γ  does not only measure the distribution of technology among 
intermediate sectors, but also measures the technological level of entire society. It 
appears in decentralized R&D conditions and impacts the decentralized growth. Because 
the technological content of a product, which is measured by its productivity parameter, 
is crucial to individual monopoly producer’s survival period and profit flow, so its 
aggregate effect, measured by Γ , should be considered in decentralized arbitrage 
equations. Contrarily, Γ  has only level effect in the social planner’s equilibrium, because 
the social planner only cares about the expansion of intermediate sectors and the progress 
of knowledge of overall economy, and doesn’t care the situation of a specific producer. 
For the government, it tends to provide protection to high-tech industries. From the 
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analytical point of view, growth effect of such policies is clear. The more high-tech 
industries exist, the higher the parameter Γ , and the higher the decentralized growth rate. 
Therefore, if decentralized economy suffers an under growth rate, such policies are 
preferred to boom the economy. 




= , we can derive the relationship of L Q Ag g g g+ = + , which 
means growth of aggregate output can be decomposed into growth of economy scales and 
growth of technology. The growth rate of industry variety is same in decentralized 
economy as in social planner’s economy, i.e., 1Q L Lg g g
α αγ
αγ
− += > in both economies. 
Expression 1 α αγ− +  measures the collective labor contribution to final output 
production including labor allocated to both final sector and to intermediate sectors; 
αγ expresses the labor contribution through intermediate goods only. The growth rate of 
leading-edge technology is related with economic growth, 1A Lg g g
α
αγ
−= − . So it is the 
technological growth that reflects the gap of economic growth rates. Thus Ag  is a better 
policy indicator than Qg  for government control, as drastic expansion of industry variety 
can say nothing about the growth inside the sectors.  
This model has two major limitations that need to be overcome through further 
research. First, although this model can safely attain optimal growth and optimal R&D 
input intensity together with zero lump-sum tax, it is risky to attain optima from all 
aspects at the same time, including optimal final output level, optimal fractions of 
allocation, etc. This task is mathematically possible, but beyond the power of policies 
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used in this model. For example, some policy may be below zero or have unexplainable 
value if investment is optimized using the simulative values as before. It is because the 
number of government policy parameters may be relative small compared with the 
complexity of this model or because we may neglect some even powerful instruments for 
economic controlling. Second, as mentioned before, this study relies crucially on the 
availability of steady-state conditions. Its discussion is valueless if those steady-state 
conditions are unavailable, and its results cannot be applied to the economies that have 
not reached their steady-state growth yet. Therefore, these problems still need to be 





 This work shows proper government interventions can guide the long-run economic 
growth to reach its socially optimal level in the non-scale model with creative destruction 
by analyzing the differences between the decentralized and social planner’s solutions. 
 In growth theory, a great amount of literatures are devoted into the study of the 
welfare implications of government policies. Significantly distinctive conclusions 
regarding such issues are drawn by economists, chiefly because fundamental ideas 
underlying their works are different from others. The exogenous growth theory, 
represented by Solow-Swan model, claims that the government is difficult to provide any 
help to long-run growth of per capita output because it depends only on technological 
progress which is exogenous. The neoclassic endogenous growth theory, represented by 
Lucas model, emphasizes government’s duty to stimulate growth by subsidizing human 
capital accumulation, which is always lower than its social optimum in private incentive 
economy. Then several outstanding R&D growth models are developed with the focus 
shifting from physical or human capital accumulation to innovation. Such models that 
contain variety expanding imply the growth rate will be too low under decentralized 
conditions, while other models that contain quality improving imply the growth rate can 
be either too low or too high, thus the integrated models, which contain both kinds of 
innovations, say decentralized growth may be either lower or higher than that of social 
planner’s economy. Therefore, the government is potent to use its policy instruments to 
adjust economic growth under these frameworks. But quality-improving R&D models 
display problematic scale effects, which are criticized by empirical studies. To overcome 
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this disadvantage, Howitt integrates dynamic progression of product variety into the 
original Aghion and Howitt (1992) model and introduces the non-scale 1999 model. 
 Under the framework of Howitt (1999), this thesis checks the gap between laissez-
faire and social planner’s economies, finds out its policy implications, analyses the 
growth effects of government policies, and shows optimal growth rate can be attained by 
well-designed government interventions. For clarity, it neglects these policies with only 
level effects on economy, such as labor-income tax and consumption tax. Instead, it 
incorporates capital-income tax, investment subsidy, intermediate-good-purchase subsidy 
as well as vertical and horizontal R&D subsidies, all of which appear in decentralized 
R&D conditions and display growth effects in the decentralized equilibrium.  
 The decentralized steady-state equilibrium is determined by vertical and horizontal 
R&D conditions, which are two downward-sloping lines in this model. And due to the 
assumption of 0 1η< <  regarding horizontal innovation, the vertical R&D condition line 
should be steeper than the horizontal one. Another character of this model is that the 
horizontal R&D intensity is proved to be independent with growth rate in decentralized 
equilibrium. The social planner’s equilibrium is also determined by its R&D conditions. 
Furthermore, it is hard to estimate whether decentralized growth is higher or lower than 
socially optimal level without government interventions. Because in this model, the 
monopolistic competition in intermediate sectors tends to cause the shortage of 
intermediate goods supplied to final-good production, thus tends to restrain growth; the 
spillover effect of vertical innovations is not considered by private research firms, which 
tends to cause insufficient R&D input; the creative destruction effect of vertical 
innovations to former producers is also not considered by private innovators and tends to 
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introduce excessive R&D input. Thus the government has the duty to control the growth 
to the socially optimal level by examining the differences between the two equilibria and 
then making up the gaps through well-designed policies.  
 Aiming at the causes of gaps between laissez-faire and social planner’s growth, this 
work uses vertical and horizontal R&D subsidies to adjust the difference caused by the 
effects of R&D externalities, uses capital-income tax and investment subsidy to control 
the incentive of physical capital accumulation, and uses intermediate-good-purchase 
subsidy to compensate the output shortage and retarded growth caused by monopolistic 
competition. More specifically, the vertical R&D subsidy has positive growth effect; 
however, the horizontal R&D subsidy has negative effect on growth. While if 
government uses untargeted R&D subsidies, the overall effect of untargeted R&D 
subsidy is positive on growth. This is because vertical innovations have stronger impacts 
on economic growth in this model. An increase of intermediate-good-purchase subsidy 
and investment subsidy will facilitate economic growth, but an increase of capital-tax 
will reduce growth rate. 31  A proper combination of these policies can control the 
economy to follow its optimal growth and optimal R&D input fractions. 
 If the government aims to attain the social planner’ equilibrium from all aspects, the 
policies that can be chosen will become quite rigid. For example, by the requirement of 
offsetting level difference between aggregate outputs, the intermediate-good-purchase 
subsidy rate is fixed at a special point. Thus even though the government could manage 
to achieve social optima for all variables theoretically and mathematically, the policies 
are difficult to be executed in practice because they are too rigid and very sensitive to 
                                                 
31 For clarity, policy conclusions deduced from Chapter 5 are summarized in Appendix F in detail. 
 58
environmental shocks, so the government may prefer to achieve optimal growth only. 
The government should consider the growth effects of several policies together and 
successfully balance their interactions so as to push decentralized growth rate to its 
socially optimal level. Using theoretical analysis and examples, this work shows such 
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Appendix A: Derivation of Equation (8) and (9). 
The producer of intermediate good i  solves his profit-maximizing problem 
1Max  
1 tit it it t it t it Y it it t it t itx
p x W L r K L A x W L r K
s
α αα −Π = − − = − −− . 
Thus the first-order conditions are 
2
1
1 tt Y it it itx
W L A x L
s
α αα γ −= − ,              (A.1) 
( )2 11
1 tt Y it it itx
r L A x K
s
α αα γ −−= − .              (A.2) 
From above relationship, the producer’s choice of labor and capital input and its output 
can be derived as 
( ) 111 1
tit L it t t Y
L A r W Lα αγα αγ α αγ α− − +− + − + −⎡ ⎤= Γ ⎣ ⎦ ,         (A.3) 
1
1 1 1
tit K it t t Y
K A r W Lα αγ αγ αγ α− + − − −⎡ ⎤= Γ ⎣ ⎦ ,            (A.4) 








ααγαγα γ γ −−⎡ ⎤Γ = −⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦ . Put 
(A.3) (A.4) into equation (6), equation (8) can be derived. 





Y it tL L di L+ =∫  and 0 tQ it tK di K=∫ , wage rate tW , interest rate tr , and labor allocation 
to final good production 
tY































,               (A.7) 
Then the final output at time t  in equation (9) can be solved out using above information 
and equation (1) and (6). 
Substitute equation (A.1~A.4) into equation (7), then we have the profit flow of 
producer of intermediate good i , 
1
1 (1 ) 1
tit it t t Y




1 (1 ) 1 11 (1 )
1 xs
αα αγ α γ αα α γ γ −+ − −Π ⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤Γ = − + ⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ −⎝ ⎠ . Therefore, at date s, the profit 
flow of the technology leader of time t  is  
1
1 (1 ) 1
sts t s s Y
A W r Lα αγ αγ α γ α− + − − − −Π ⎡ ⎤Π = Γ ⎣ ⎦ .             (A.9) 
Using equation (A.5~A.7) and (9), (A.9) can be rewritten as equation (10) with the 
considerations that wage rate grows as same rate of per capita output and interest rate is a 






Appendix B: The Solution to the Representative Household’s 
Optimization Problem. 
The representative householder’s utility maximizing problem is 
1
0








−∫ i  
( ) ( ){ }1S.T.   1 11t t k t k L t t tkK W r s g K C Ts τ= + − − − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦− . 
The current-value Hamiltonian is 
( ) ( ){ }1 1 1 11 1t t t k t k L t t tk





Η = + + − − − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦− − . 








ε θ−∂Η = − =∂ − ,              (B.1) 
( ) ( )1 1
1
t




θ τ ρθ θ∂Η = − − − = −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∂ −  ,       (B.2) 
lim 0t t tt e K
ρ θ−→∞ = .               (B.3) 
where tθ  is a co-state variable. Solving the above first-order conditions, we have the 




Appendix C: Derivation of Equation (33) and (34). 
To solve the social planner’s static choice problem, set up the Lagrangian as 
( ) ( ) ( )1 110 0 0t t tQ Q Qt it it it it t itL L L di A L K di K K diα α γα αγ αγ ξ− −− += − − −∫ ∫ ∫ , 
where ξ  is the coefficient. The first-order conditions are 





Y it it Y it it it
it
L L A x di L A K L
L
α γα α α α αγ αγα αγ −− − − + −∂ = − − + =∂ ∫ ,  (C.1) 
( ) ( )11 11 0
tY it it it
it
L L A K L
K
α αγα α αγ αγα γ ξ− − +− − +∂ = − + =∂ .       (C.2) 
Integrating equation (C.1) and (C.2) on both sides, we obtain following relationships of 









ξ α γ= − − .                (C.4) 
Then substituting (C.3) and (C.4) into equation (C.1) and (C.2), we get 
( ) ( )1 11 11 1 11 11
tit it t t t Y
L A L K Y L
α αγ
α γα αγ α αγα ααγ α αγ
− +
− −− + − + −− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − + ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ,    (C.5) 
( ) ( ) 11 1 1 11 11
tit it t t t Y
K A L K Y L
αγ
α αγ αγ αγα ααγ α αγ − − + − −− −⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦ .      (C.6) 
Putting equation (C.3~C.6), together with resource constraints, into equation (1) and 
(6), after rearranging, we can write out the output of final good and intermediate goods as 
equation (33) and (34) respectively. 
 65
Appendix D: Derivation of Social Planner’s Equilibrium. 
The current-value Hamiltonian is 
( ) ( ) ( )







      
t
t t t Y t t t t t t
v t t t h t t t
C L n h Q A L K C L
n Y Q h Y A
ε α α γα αγ α αγ
η
θε
θ σλ θ λ
− − −− + − +⎡ ⎤′Η = + − − Γ Γ −⎣ ⎦−
+ +
, 
where tK , tA  and tQ  are state variables, tC , tn  and th  are control variables, 1θ , 2θ  and 
3θ  are co-state variables regarding to capital tK , technology tA  and intermediate 
industry variety tQ  respectively. Thus the maximum-principle conditions are 




ε θ−∂Η = − =∂ ,               (D.1) 




θ θ σλ∂Η = − + =∂ ,              (D.2) 
1
1 3 0t h t t t
t
Y h Y A
h
ηθ θ λ η −∂Η = − + =∂ ,              (D.3) 
( )1 2 3 1 11 tt t v t t h t t
t t
Yn h n Q h A
K K
ηθ θ σλ θ λ θ ρθ∂∂Η ⎡ ⎤= − − + + = − +⎣ ⎦∂ ∂  ,   (D.4) 
( ) ( )1 2 3 2 21 t ttt t v t t h t
t t t
Y AYn h n Q h
A A A
ηθ θ σλ θ λ θ ρθ∂∂∂Η = − − + + = − +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∂ ∂ ∂  ,  (D.5) 
( ) ( )1 3 2 3 31 t ttt t h t t v t
t t t
Y QYn h h A n
Q Q Q
ηθ θ λ θ σλ θ ρθ∂∂∂Η ⎡ ⎤= − − + + = − +⎣ ⎦∂ ∂ ∂  ,  (D.6) 
( ) ( ) ( )1 11 1
1
1t t t Y t t t t t tK n h Q A L K C L
α α γα αγ α αγ
θ
− −− + − +∂Η ′= = − − Γ Γ −∂
  ,     (D.7) 
2
t v t t tA n Y Qσλθ
∂Η = =∂
  ,               (D.8) 
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3
t h t t tQ h Y A
ηλθ
∂Η = =∂
 ,                (D.9) 
The transversality conditions are 1lim 0
t
tt
e Kρ θ−→∞ = , 2lim 0t tt e Aρ θ−→∞ =  and 3lim 0t tt e Qρ θ−→∞ = .   
Equation (D.1~D.3) mean that the Hamiltonian is to be maximized with respect to control 
variables tC , tn  th  respectively; (D.4~D.6) are equations of motion for co-state 
variables 1θ , 2θ  and 3θ ; (D.7~D.9) are equations of motion for state variables tK , tA  and 
tQ . 
Solving the above first order conditions, we get the social planner’s decisions. First, 
from equation (D.1~D.3), we have following relationships of co-state variables 
1
1 2 3v t h t tQ h A C








θθ θ ε εθ θ θ= − = − = − = −
 
.           (D.11) 
Then, substituting these relationships together with (D.7~D.9) into (D.4~D.6) and then 





Appendix E: Parameter Analysis of Simulation in Chapter 4. 
The parameter sensitivity of the benchmark point in social planner’s economy, 
where 0.4α = , 0.6γ = , 0.3ε = , 0.05σ = , 0.4η = , 0.04ρ = , 0.5vλ = , 0.5hλ = , and 
0.013Lg = , is analyzed here, we calculate the equilibrium values when each parameter 
fluctuates within 10%±  holding other parameters unchanged in following table. The 
benchmark values are marked by shadow. 
Table 1: Parameter Sensitivity Analysis of Simulated Equilibrium 
α  η  ρ  
α  g  h  η  g  h  ρ  g  h  
0.36 0.0364 0.899 0.36 0.036 0.048 0.036 0.0308 0.763 
0.37 0.0366 0.440 0.37 0.036 0.051 0.037 0.0323 0.386 
0.38 0.0365 0.215 0.38 0.0359 0.055 0.038 0.0337 0.196 
0.39 0.0363 0.111 0.39 0.036 0.058 0.039 0.0349 0.106 
0.40 0.0359 0.062 0.4 0.0359 0.062 0.04 0.0359 0.062 
0.41 0.0355 0.038 0.41 0.0359 0.066 0.041 0.0369 0.039 
0.42 0.0349 0.025 0.42 0.0359 0.069 0.042 0.0379 0.026 
0.43 0.0345 0.017 0.43 0.0359 0.073 0.043 0.0388 0.019 
0.44 0.0340 0.012 0.44 0.0358 0.077 0.044 0.0397 0.014 
 
σ  vλ  hλ  
σ  g  h  vλ  g  h  hλ  g  h  
0.045 0.036 0.06 0.45 0.036 0.05 0.45 0.0358 0.077 
0.046 0.036 0.06 0.46 0.036 0.052 0.46 0.0358 0.074 
0.047 0.036 0.06 0.47 0.036 0.054 0.47 0.0358 0.071 
0.048 0.0359 0.06 0.48 0.036 0.057 0.48 0.0359 0.068 
0.049 0.0359 0.06 0.49 0.0359 0.06 0.49 0.0359 0.065 
0.05 0.0359 0.062 0.5 0.0359 0.062 0.5 0.0359 0.062 
0.051 0.0359 0.065 0.51 0.0359 0.065 0.51 0.0359 0.06 
0.052 0.0359 0.067 0.52 0.0359 0.067 0.52 0.036 0.057 
0.053 0.0359 0.07 0.53 0.0359 0.07 0.53 0.036 0.055 
0.054 0.0358 0.073 0.54 0.0358 0.073 0.54 0.036 0.053 
0.055 0.0358 0.076 0.55 0.0358 0.076 0.55 0.036 0.051 
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γ  ε  Lg  
γ  g  h  ε  g  h  Lg  g  h  
0.54 0.0367 0.278 0.270 0.0348 0.109 0.0117 0.0362 0.012 
0.55 0.0366 0.208 0.275 0.035 0.099 0.0119 0.0362 0.015 
0.56 0.0365 0.157 0.280 0.0352 0.09 0.0121 0.0361 0.019 
0.57 0.0364 0.121 0.285 0.0354 0.082 0.0123 0.0361 0.024 
0.58 0.0362 0.095 0.290 0.0356 0.074 0.0125 0.036 0.031 
0.59 0.0361 0.076 0.295 0.0357 0.068 0.0127 0.036 0.04 
0.6 0.0359 0.062 0.3 0.0359 0.062 0.0129 0.036 0.053 
0.61 0.0358 0.051 0.305 0.0361 0.057 0.013 0.0359 0.062 
0.62 0.0356 0.043 0.310 0.0363 0.052 0.0131 0.0359 0.073 
0.63 0.0354 0.037 0.315 0.0365 0.048 0.0133 0.0358 0.1 
0.64 0.0352 0.031 0.320 0.0367 0.044 0.0135 0.0356 0.141 
0.65 0.035 0.027 0.325 0.0378 0.027 0.0137 0.0354 0.202 
0.66 0.0348 0.024 0.330 0.0397 0.014 0.0139 0.0352 0.291 
      0.0141 0.0349 0.419 
      0.0143 0.0345 0.598 
 
 
In the table, we find the changes of α , the measure of monopoly power, ρ , the time 
preference of household have greater impacts on economic equilibrium near the 
benchmark point, while the change of σ , the measure of spillover effect, is relatively 
harder to cause great impact. 
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Appendix F: Summary of Policy Conclusions. 
Table 2: Summary of Policy Conclusions 
Symbol Name Policy Aims 
s  Untargeted R&D Subsidy Rate To control growth by adjusting overall R&D 
production.  
vs  Vertical R&D Subsidy Rate To adjust growth by changing the marginal cost of vertical innovations. 
hs  Horizontal R&D Subsidy Rate To adjust growth by changing the marginal cost of horizontal innovations. 
kτ  Capital Income Tax To adjust growth by affecting households’ after-tax income from capital holding. 
ks  Investment Subsidy Rate To adjust growth by affecting households’ incentive of investment. 
xs  Intermediate-Good-Purchase Subsidy Rate 
To offset the shortage of intermediate goods supplied 
to final sector. 
T   Lump-Sum Tax To balance government budget sheet. 
 
Symbol Growth Effects  Other Attributes 
s  
Positive growth effect, 0g
s
∂ >∂  No impact on R&D input intensities, 0
h n
s s
∂ ∂= =∂ ∂  




∂ >∂  Discouraging on horizontal R&D, 0v
h
s
∂ <∂  




∂ <∂  Encouraging horizontal R&D, 0h
h
s
∂ >∂  




∂ <∂  Discourage capital holding, 0k
K
τ
∂ <∂  















∂ >∂  





∂ >∂  and 0x
Y
s
∂ >∂  
T   
 No growth effect; 0
g
T
∂ =∂  
 
 
